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"ldola" of the Postmodern 
Untopical Considerations on the End 
(and the Principle) of History 
Giacomo Marramao 
1. SECULARIZATION AS "LOPSIDED" PLAN: 
THE LIMITS OF LOWITH'S INTERPRETATION 
From the late medieval period on there emerges-in concomi-
tance with the work of the glossators 1-a particular way of conceiving 
of political change. This consists of a resumption and a readapta-
tion of the old cyclic schema of Polybius and is mediated by a 
true rediscovery of Aristotle's Politics. The aristotelian text-"ca-
nonical text of this story," according to Bobbio's definition 2-is 
the great absence from the "de civitate" disputes of the christian 
literature of the first centuries: it is, in fact, rediscovered only at 
the end of the thirteenth century (while for the rediscovery of 
Cicero's De Republica we have to wait until the beginning of the 
fourteenth century no less). The effect of the "rediscovery" is, as 
often happens in cases of this kind, absolutely diremptive: the 
celebrated classification of the forms of government (which distin-
guishes, as is well known, three good forms-monarchy, aristoc-
racy and politeia-and three bad ones-tyrannies, oligarchies and 
democracy) is not only taken up again and made the object of 
renewed reflection, but is reproduced and applied to a reality 
which is rather different from that of the declining polis which 
constituted the historical-sociological referent of Greek phil-
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osophy. It should suffice to recall that Marsilio of Padua himself, 
in the eighth chapter of a major work like the Defensor pacis (1324), 
does nothing more than reinstate "a repetition pure and simple" 3 
of the aristotelian schema . On the other hand, the case of 
Machiavelli (which we cannot, for obvious reasons, engage at 
length on this occasion) would merit a separate discussion. Prima 
facie, the machiavellian oeuvre seems to be constituted in perfect 
continuity with the reinstatement of the classical model of politics. 
This impression is, however, deceptive for two sets of reasons. 
In the first place, the florentine secretary did not refer directly to 
the Politics of Aristotle, but to the sixth book of Polybius' Histories, 
in which the classification is inserted into a cyclic movement of 
the "anakyklesis ," in such a way as to interpenetrate with a "cyclic 
theory" of platonic ancestry. 4 In the second place, the alternation 
of the good forms with the "defective" and "corrupt" ones no 
longer occurs through the stimulus of an inexorable natural neces-
sity, which is independent of the will and the subjective choices 
(the polybian physeos ananke), but occurs "randomly between 
men," 5 that is to say: as the contingent result of their actions. 
Thanks to this powerful inflection of the classical apparatus, the 
"reappearance of Polybius in western culture" (according to an 
expression of our great scholar of antiquity, the late Arnaldo 
Momigliano 6) comes to coincide with the affirmation of that arti-
ficiality of the state-political order, which represents, starting with 
Machiavelli, the political model for modernity itself. 
Yet beyond these preliminary historical exactitudes, there 
lurks a theoretical problem, which we now intend to focus on. It 
has its roots in the concomitance which was mentioned at the begin-
ning. What does this concomitance involve? A decisive fact not 
only on the genetic level, but also on the more narrowly" doctrinal" 
one: the contemporaneity of the birth of the (modern) concept of 
revolution and of the (modern) concept of sovereignty. Parallel with 
the reinstatement on the part of the glossators of the famous 
fragment of Ulpiano around the "summa legibusque soluta poles-
tas" and the formula "rex superiorem non recognoscens in regno 
suo est imperator" (along a not always continuous trajectory, 
which reaches its crowning point with hobbesian theory 7) light is 
shed upon, in the body of the european politico-juridical doctrines, 
a schema for change which has more or less this form : oppression, 
liberation, social contract, political struggle, new society. This pro-
cess gradually assumes the outlines of that which we moderns 
have called, for these past two centuries, revolutionary process. 
And, even if the term revolution (which consists of the transposition 
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of the greek term apokatastasis), in its present-day meaning of 
political overthrow, has a relatively recent usage, there is no doubt 
that since the renaissance period its pragmatic usage already tends 
to pierce the shield of the astronomical and astrological metaphor. 
Although with Machiavelli one still spoke of the "circle" around 
which the republics "turn," it is not difficult to realize that, in 
reality, that circle does not close and that its movement has, by 
this time, taken a direction forward which already seems to allude 
in more respects than one to the cumulative idea of Process to 
which we are accustomed. 
The story implicit in the schema just reported is not, however, 
equally told everywhere. It is not a universal schema common to 
all civilizations, but regards specifically the Occident as the heir 
of an idea of linear, irreversible and progressively "liberatory" 
time, whose origin goes back to the very eschatological conception 
of judaism and christianity. The idea of the judaeo-christian con-
ception of the "redemption" as the explanatory key of the abso-
lutely unique cultural event of the Occident (and of the hegemonic 
destiny of this "uniqueness," whose power of rationalization, ca-
pable of imposing itself on all other cultures, is literally incom-
prehensible, if it is distinguished from that originary interior 
energy), goes back, as is well known, to Max Weber. 8 In his wake, 
it has nevertheless found a rather ample and articulated treatment 
in the work of Karl Lowith. 9 The specific contribution of this 
important German scholar consists-above and beyond his overall 
hermeneutic schema as a key to the "secularization" and to the 
radical criticism of every philosophy of history-in having pointed 
out the sources of the modern idea of progress (cultivated in its 
most markedly "lay" and illuministic physiognomy: that of the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries in the rebirth of the mille-
nary thought of the late medieval and protomodern periods). We 
have here a starting point which surpasses by far the ambit of 
historiographical reconstruction in order to lodge itself in the heart 
of theoretic philosophy stricto sensu, namely, the idea for which, 
if the specific aspect of occidental Kultur lies in an intuition of 
time as the mere availability for consumption of itself and in the 
consequent valorization of the irreversibility aspect insofar as it is 
the expression-precisely-of a time-in-consumption (of a "dying 
time," of a time which is, and exclusively, for-its-death), it follows 
that not only the concept of revolution, but also that of progress, 
would descend from the "hope of redemption" and would be 
nothing more than secular "millenarianism" and secularized "mes-
sianism." 10 
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Lowith' s interpretative schema will never be sufficiently val-
orized in our culture, owing to the way in which it succeeds in 
destabilizing some of the most consolidated and widespread topoi 
of the historical mentality. In spite of this, it is afflicted with a 
rather serious limitation, which consists, in the first place, in em-
phasizing all but unilaterally the genealogy to the detriment of 
the conceptual stratigraphy, that is to say, of the analysis of determi-
nate historical-conceptual metamorphoses and changes. In the 
Lowithian schema, the following question remains completely 
unanswered: Through what translations of sense has the tempor-
ality of the old "theologies of history" (from Augustine and Orosio 
to Bossuet) been able to enrich the "philosophie de l'histoire" of 
illuministic stamp? But, beyond this general methodological limit, 
a more determinate limit is to be reckoned with in the schema 
which brings the modern ideas of progress and of revolution back 
to the political messianism of Joachim da Fiore or to the seven 
protestants of puritan stamp, there is ratified and coercively united 
a line which tends to "remove," or to relegate to the rank of 
negligible "intervals," the periodic rebirths of cyclic models (the most 
visible case is that of the renaissance, but other eloquent periods-
from the seventeenth century, from the eighteenth century, and 
from the nineteenth century itself, commonly defined as "century 
of progress"-could be adduced). 
This Verdriingung involves rather weighty consequences: on 
both the historiographical level, as well as on the more exclusively 
theoretical one . In the first place, the Lowithian inability to discern 
the persistence of the thread line and circle: the true "Gordian 
knot," which runs across the entire event of the Zeitauffassung, of 
the occidental "concertion of time," in which is included the 
judaeo-christian one. 1 And, in the second instance, the assem-
bling under a single matrix of categories subtended to phenomena 
and doctrinal complexes which are rather heterogeneous among 
themselves: messianism, eschatological vision, and apocalyptic 
vision are-in this sense-anything but synonymous. But in order 
to find their differential features, it is necessary to call into question 
another idea, to which the idea of revolution appears closely re-
lated: the idea of Exodus-. The schema of the exodus, the great 
religious archetype of "linear temporality" (to undertake an 
exodus, it is necessary to go out from a point x towards a point 
y: it is necessary, in other words, to go towards ... ), does it not 
perhaps also reconnect the image of a "promised land" (ou-topic 
image which hints at an ou-chronic movement) to the idea of a 
restoration of a status quo ante? Of revolution, in the literal-
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etymological sense of restoration? Therefore: of "cycle"? Will not 
the Revolution then always necessarily be conceived as a revolution 
according to the Law? 
2. AT THE ORIGINS OF HISTORY: THE EXODUS AS THE 
NARRATIVE PROTOTYPE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS 
The Book of Exodus has for centuries constitued the her-
meneutic model of the revolutionary process of liberation. Reflec-
tion on it is then an unavoidable step for getting to the bottom 
of the variegated conceptual constructs which are at the founda-
tions of the western theory of "revolution" in its dual variant: 
"absolute" revolution (understood as the secular transposition of 
the eschatological hope and, for this reason, as Event of universal 
value) and revolution as "relative-historical" fact (understood as 
a specific spatio-temporal response to specific problems). In this 
sense, the investigation of the Exodus theme appears indispens-
able for unravelling the Gordian knot constituted by the indiscrimi-
nate assemblage of terms such as "messianism," "eschatology" 
and "apocalypse." 
The Exodus is, above all, a narrative structure: a tale. It is, 
as the american philosopher Michael Walzer 12 observes, "the story 
of release and liberation expressed in religious terms." But it "is 
also an historical tale, secular and earthly." In other words, it is 
not a question of a supernatural tale-although the miracle is a 
part of it-but of a realistic tale. And, as in every self-respecting 
story, there is a before and an irrevocable after. That is: irreducible 
to any desire for reversibility, any "magic circle" of mythology. 
As "movement in the literal sense," as "advancement in space 
and time," Exodus represents then "the originary form (or for-
mula) of the progressive story." 
Up to this point, the interpretation submitted by Walzer (put 
forward on the basis of direct and accurate analysis of Exodus, 
Numbers and Deuteronomy and an indirect hermeneutic, that is, 
conducted on English translations of the texts of the medieval 
Jewish commentators: from Midrash Rabbah to Mekilta De-Rabbi 
Ishmael, from the notes of Rashi to the commentaries of 
Nachmanides 13) would appear to follow exactly the example of 
Lowith, almost as if it were meant to corroborate its genealogy 
through the detailed examination of the principal old testament 
topoi. Accordingly, the narrative machinery of the Book of Exodus 
would have penetrated into "our political culture" on account of 
the "centrality of the Bible in western thought and its continual 
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re-reading." That is the reason why, concludes Walzer, "the think-
ing of Exodus seems to have survived to the secularization of 
political theory." Not only the definition, but also the conclusion 
of this reasoning would appear, therefore, to confirm the Lowith-
ian interpretation, for which the secularizing dynamic, far from 
constituting a process of dissolution "without residue" of the 
theologemes, would limit itself to dislocating its center of gravity, 
in the sense of a growing sacralization of the events of the "profane" 
world. 
Yet the parallel visions induced by these general propositions 
are misleading and deceptive. Very different, if not quite opposite, 
is the objective of the author. He aims, in fact, to demonstrate 
that the assumption of Exodus inside a cosmic vision distinguished 
by the circular movement which goes from the creation (and suc-
cessive fall) to the final redemption is produced because of an 
unwarranted transposition of that narrative schema into an es-
chatological and apocalyptical key: linear time, introduced into an 
historical (and not cosmological) abode by the Book of Exodus, 
would thus come to be assimilated to the late jewish and proto-
christian eschatologies of a gnostic character and to the "apocalyptic 
doctrines of Daniel and of the Apocalypse." 
A further semantic slippage of the narrative of Exodus would 
be brought about, according to the American scholar, as a conse-
quence of the superimposing of the messianic conception. Except 
that we must recall something which the "genealogists" a la Lowith 
have barely considered, namely, that messianism enters late in 
jewish history. Although messianism does appear-as Saad ya 
Gaon, jewish philosopher of the ninth century, was to note 14-
through the thinking of Exodus, where, for instance, the final 
redemption is nothing more than the originary redemption (it, 
too, preceded, in the Hebrew versions, by a new Exodus, by the 
reappearance of Moses, etc.), there's an additional and more sig-
nificant circumstance which refers to the exclusively doctrinal 
level. In fact, though characterized by the introduction of the idea 
of the "end of the days" and by the promise of "new heavens 
and new earth," messianism is differentiated form the eschatolog-
ical and apocalyptical visions by its refusal of all waiting and for 
its readiness to "force the End." Which does not mean, Walzer 
comments, "to act only politically (instead of waiting for the omni-
potent intervention of God), but to act politically for the final 
goal." Notwithstanding this distinction, Walzer seems to sym-
pathize with the clean break operated by Gershom Scholem be-
tween political zionism and messianic judaism: 
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I deny absolutely that zionism is a messianic movement [ ... ] 
the redemption of the jewish people, which I wish for as a 
Zionist, is in no way identical with the religious redemption that 
I hope for in the future [ ... ]. The zionist ideal is one thing 
and the messianic ideal another and the two do not meet unless 
in the pompous phraseology of mass parades. 15 
13 
If Scholem, however, limited himself to affirming the unsuturable 
dieresis between the level of the "promise" of redemption and 
the level of political utopia (of any political utopia), Walzer hastens 
to bring back without hesitation the great metaphor of Exodus to 
the second of the two levels in question: and it is exactly such a 
reductio which enables him, as we shall soon see, to operate a 
moderate disenchantment (as an "ameliorist") with the idea of 
"revolution." What counts above all else for him is to confirm the 
radical heterogeneity between the biblical Exodus and the ancient 
legends of journeys which-no matter how they turn out-begin 
and end "at home": from the journey of Odysseus to Ithaca and 
the journey to Byblos in Phoenicia of the egyptian priest of the 
eleventh century, Wen-Amon. For the living israelites, the prom-
ised land is a "new land" where there is no one to welcome them. 
The Book of Exodus-the american scholar therefore con-
cludes-realizes in the meantime a decisive break with every cos-
mological narrative (myth of the Eternal Return) in that it puts 
into effect an historical narrative. Beneath this profile, it also rep-
resents the quintessence of biblical narration in its entirety, where 
"historical events occur once and draw [their] full significance 
from a system of interconnections between past and present, and 
not from the hierarchic correspondences of myth." It is the historic 
"virtuosity" of the narrative schema of Exodus-facing the circular 
"viciousness" of the Eternal Return-which makes possible its 
transposition into a sort of politological model of change: Egypt-
desert-promised land-that is, the three narrative stages of Exodus 
(beginning-middle-end)-can thus be easily translated into the 
triad problem-struggle-solution. To the point of inducing it to 
speak of a "politics of Exodus" with an amphibious profile: "mod-
erate and prudent," if compared to political messianism; "rev-
olutionary," if compared to the passivity and resignation of the 
traditional ideologies. 
Neat scheme, that of Walzer. And what is more, impeccably 
executed. However, a problem remains, mentioned by the author 
himself and never taken up again (et pour cause: given that its 
treatment would have obscured the "ameliorist" wisdom of his 
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reading of Exodus): the power of Exodus is not so much in the 
beginning of the story, as in its conclusion: the divine promise. But 
the Promise is also the prime agent, the engine of the exodus 
itself. For this reason, principle and end are all one: they are 
reconnected in a circular motion whose center is not topological 
or geographical , but ethical. Principle and end reside-equal be-
fore the Law-not in a hyperuranian and remote transcendence, 
but in the dimension close to us of interiority: "within your mouth 
and within your heart," as it is said in Deuteronomy (30: 11-14). 
Egypt is not only left behind. It is refused. That is: judged and 
condemned. And the fundamental terms of this judgment are: 
oppression and corruption. But what is it that makes the judgment 
possible, if not the Promise? The moral force of that judgment 
would be nothing without the idea of a life which is no longer 
oppressive and corrupt: from which oppression and corruption 
are definitively eradicated. 
Does not then another story begin here, this one indeed truly 
discontinuous with respect to the classical mythologemes of the 
Eternal Return? A story in which Geschehen (mere "happening"), 
invested with "sense" in its totality and the meaning of "value" 
deep within its most negligible particulars, becomes Geschichte? 
A story in which the interweaving of "line" and "circle" is repro-
posed on the assumption of the ethical judgment and the demand 
for commutation and redemption? 
The terms of the question thus recast, the operation-which 
culminates in the figure of the Entzauberung or of the Ent-
mythologisierung (of the secular "disenchantment" or of the 
theological "demythologization")-will necessarily assume more 
dramatic and, literally, more radical profiles. 16 It will happen, that 
is, not indeed in terms of a banal line of demarcation with respect 
to eschatological and apocalyptical perspectives, but (on the con-
trary) by starting from a disputed abrogation, which involves, at 
its foundations, the "futurism" implicit in the modern concepts 
of History, Progress and Revolution. Secular theorists of society 
and politics such as Max Weber and christian theologians such as 
Barth, Bultmann and Gogarten have only produced, in this sense, 
courageous and powerful records of a process which has already 
occurred in "things themselves," which is already "consumed" 
by the same dynamic of "modern secularization." The radicality 
and the seriousness with which these authors take note of the 
already occurred "disenchantment with the world" is, when all 
is said and done, in the lucid awareness that the counteraims (the 
so-called perverse effects of Progress) are not at all in presumed 
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"exogenous" factors (in obstacles or unforeseen variables that the 
modern project was not able to envisage opportunely), but rather 
sink their own roots in the same "monotheistic" structure of 
Historical Time from which "high profile" categories such as Rev-
olution or Liberation-as much as "low profile" categories like 
increment, growth, improvement, etc.--draw so much nourish-
ment. The failure, which involves the entire complex of these 
categories, formed in the great cultural climate of the european 
enlightenment, has been visible for some time now in the pro-
liferating of the oxymorons most characteristic of the political lex-
icon of the twentieth century, expressions such as "right-wing 
revolution" or "conservative revolution." And it is in this same 
span of years that terms such as progress and evolution end up 
losing the positive axiological thurst they had at the beginning, 
giving way to neutral categories such as modernization and develop-
ment. Is it not perhaps by virtue of this neutralization that the 
same Revolutionsbegriff comes to lose its own disruptive and liber-
atory features, in order to be transformed into a factor of modern-
ization, susceptible to becoming an object of cold quantitative and 
comparative analyses? 
If all of this represents, without a shadow of doubt, the his-
torical-sociological outcome of the "disenchantment," it is, how-
ever, necessary to add that this outcome does not at all exhaust 
its importance and implications on the ethico-philosophical level. 
From the Entzauberung, understood as the conclusion of modern-
ity, and from the Entmythologisierung, understood as the landing-
place for secularized monotheism, a new culture climate is in fact 
released, and whose implications are investigated by neither the 
new postmodern apologetic of the "death of God" nor the various 
deconstructionist or hermeneutic approaches to the thematics of 
the Subject and of the Foundation: the polytheistic cultural order. 
3. "POLYTHEISM" AND CONFLICT OF VALUES : FROM THE 
"PRINZIP HOFFNUNG" TO THE "PRINZIP VERANTWORTUNG" 
Starting with the nietzschean announcement of the "death of 
God," our epoch has been insistently connoted as the era of 
polytheism. Diagnostic schemes prepared by very different disci-
plinary perspectives and ideals-from philosophy to theology, 
from history to anthropology-have converged on the definition 
of the Occident as "exploded cultural sphere." 
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Polytheism remains, however, an equivocal term. On account 
of a sort of energetic thrust endogenous to the world itself, it 
seems to allude to a polymorphous signification, leaving unde-
cided whether it is a question of a return of the old gods or of 
the advent of "new gods" in a sort of neopagan cultural climate 
from vanished "ideolo~cal" confines: not by chance the theme of 
the "new polytheism" 1 continues even today to represent one of 
the battle cries of the "new right," as of the "new left." This aspect 
of the matter, however, seems to us secondary with respect to a 
hermeneutic implication more profound than that which the ex-
pression polytheism implies: the disenchantment inaugurated by 
the" death of God" does not involve a world which is de-ideologized 
and de-sacralized tout court. The disenchantment involves, in-
stead, that return of the "ancient gods" who "aspire to dominate 
our life and therefore to resume their eternal contest," which an 
author as sober and restrained as Max Weber explicitly mentions 
in his famous conference Science as Profession (held in 1918-exactly 
in the culminating year of the geistige Entscheidungen-at Munich 
in Bavaria before a group of students returned from the war). 18 
The weberian definition of secularization can, obviously, be 
accepted or even rejected in toto. If, however, it is assumed as the 
point of departure, it is necessary to resist the temptation to carry 
out convenient reductions of it and to be prepared to accept all 
its complexity as well as the "gravity" of its consequences. It is 
well-known that Weber intends the return of the "ancient" gods 
as the virile ascent of a plurality-tragically undecidable on the 
philosophical, or theoretical plane strictu sensu-of "centers of 
value." It follows, therefore, that that "return" does not at all 
constitute a faithful repetition of the old and that, as a conse-
quence, we can speak of the "antiquity" of those gods only by way 
of pallid analogy. That which is meant then by the term polytheism 
is, in reality, nothing more than the non-mechanical derivative 
(once one would have said dialectic) of the monotheistic cultural 
climates which mark the advent of "occidental rationalism" in its 
phase of maximum disclosure. The problem of the modern-a 
term today so abused as to have almost lost all semantic effective-
ness-resides for Weber almost entirely in this "ambivalence": in 
the unforeseen (and yet endogenously predestined) "dialectical" 
counteraltar of its outcomes. If, however, a certain dialectic could 
be adumbrated-in the way in which Weber, at the conclusion of 
the Protestant Ethic, represents the overturning of that which, at 
its beginnings, had the appearance of a "fine veil" in the oppres-
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sive "steel cage" of the administered world 19-it is well to be clear 
that the dialectic is entirely sui generis: it lacks, in fact, the charac-
terizing moment of the Aufhebung, of the repealing-becoming true 
of the "negative"; so the outcome of the process comes to coincide 
with a bare crystallization effect of "linear temporality" rather than 
with an act of resolution. Looked on with hindsight, from the per-
spective of its result, the advent of the plurisecular process of 
rationalization and "making worldly" of the regulating principles 
of science and politics, which make up the cultural patrimony of 
the modern Occident, is represented as an unheard of dissemina-
tion of the decisionistic energies (of the Miichte or "powers") con-
tained in the "centers of value." Read in a bad light, and availing 
oneself of adequate hermeneutic lenses, the great weberian 
schema seems to communicate to us that the occidental project 
of technico-scientific neutralization of the originary "powers" has 
ended up giving space to a critical mass of counteraims, which 
appear less and less governable within the networks-increasingly 
more sophisticated, but also more and more exasperatingly self-ref-
erential-of the formal rationality of "enlightenment" stamp. And 
once again, looked at from the point of view of its conclusion, 
the act of progressive erosion of the onto-theological and metaphys-
ical fundamentals seems to flow into its symmetrical opposite: into 
the extreme diffusion and generalization of the originary "deities" 
neutralized by the principio monoteista. 20 
With undoubted sensibility and acuteness, Gianni Vattimo 
has been able, in some of his recent interventions, 21 to stigmatize 
this phenomenon. Only today, he has noted most opportunely, 
can we realize that 
not only (as Max Weber has taught) is the economic and technical 
rationalization of modern society the offspring of judaeo-christian 
monotheism and the calvinist ethic, but also the awareness of the 
historicity and relativity of the scientific paradigms, of the inconclu-
siveness and indefiniteness of science-or, to sum up, of a certain 
"lightness" of being-is an extreme result of christian being .22 
All this would have led to the deflagration of the autarchical model 
on both sides of the question: that of reason and that of faith. On 
the side of reason, with the awareness of the "historicity of the 
scientific paradigms": that is to say, let us add, with the substitu-
tion of the old external metaphysical realism ( characterized by a 
univocal notion of "reality" and "correspondence") for that which 
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Hilary Putnam calls "internal metaphysical realism" (for which the 
aforementioned notions depend on a "cartographic convention," 
which relativizes them to the various languages of the scientific 
disciplines). On the side of faith, with the awareness of the 
"(mythological) character of many pages of the Bible": that is to 
say, with the detaching of the authentic religious nucleus (inherent 
in the salvational problematic) from the doctrinal apparatus of the 
various secular theologies . 
The way in which Vattimo focuses on the "spiritual situation 
of the times" (to evoke a famous expression adopted by Karl 
Jaspers 23 at the beginning of the 1930s) is, in our opinion, correct. 
Apt, in fact, is the description of the effects of exploded monotheism 
as the copresence of old deposits which reemerge (and which 
ratzingerian theology uses without embarrassment: starting with 
that superstitious and apocalyptic rediscovery of the "meaning of 
sin" and of the "belief in the devil," which a rigorous theology 
of secularization should enumerate among the most typical 
phenomena of "secularization" 24 ), and that "diffuse expectation 
before religion" which had precisely nothing in common with 
neopagan inclinations. The sole aspect of Va ttimo' s analysis which 
we are not inclined to share is that implicit in the affirmation-by 
now become all too widespread as a slogan in the intellectual and 
pseudointellectual lexicon of these past few years-of the "light-
ness of being" which would result from the christian message. 
Except that the dissent on this aspect touches on a philosophi-
cal-theological point which is not at all marginal, but, on the 
contrary, profound and decisive. It is contained in the question: 
Has christianity involved an exoneration or better a new, and in 
a certain sense absolute, burden of responsibility of human reason 
before the event, and especially before that Event which we iden-
tify with the "world"? If it is true that, at the center of the christian 
message, "there is a God who-neither out of pretence nor for a 
temporary disguise for pedagogic purposes, but seriously and out 
of love-was made man, that is, he lowered and reduced himself"; 
if it is true that it is precisely Christianity which subtracts from 
being, "that of which greek metaphysics and then modern scien-
tism have always spoken in terms of necessity, the rigidity and 
the static condition which render every story, every contingency 
and every thing which cannot be foreseen unthinkable": if all that 
is true, should not there follow a great-indeed, absolute----<:oef-
ficient of responsibility, and not an exoneration of responsibility, 
before the being of the world? Does not Vattimo believe that it 
was exactly the eternal spirals of cyclic time-only apparently 
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leaden, with Milan Kundera's permission-to "exonerate" man 
and philosophy of every responsibility before the event, before 
the most intricate sense of the happening? 
Precisely this last aspect, when all is said and done, calls into 
question the name of a thinker who, before Weber, had tried to 
envisage the destiny of occidental reason, starting with the "com-
ing into the world" of the divine: precisely the name of Hegel. It 
is difficult, at this point, to overcome the impression that, if this 
change is exempted from the hegelian conceptual dimension (with 
everything which that involves in terms of a new burden of respon-
sibility: philosophical and ethical at the same time), it then succeeds 
in resolving the dilemmas man/history, reason/event, I/world, 
which deeply scar thinking in our century. Thus, how difficult it 
is to escape from the temptation to discern that which is Presup-
posed in the "zero-sum" readings of Hegel as an equal and con-
trary "reaction" to the philosophically deresponsibilizing, even if 
ethically vigilant (and anything but unprepared), effects of "weak 
thought." 
Hence the legitimate suspicion that the present reinstatement 
of the fsroblematic (of a late schellingian flavor) of the Presuppo-
sition, 5 although conceived in diametrical opposition to every 
onto-theology, finishes up, when all is said and done, carrying 
out, willingly or unwillingly, the same neutralizing function of the 
old metaphysical theme of the Foundation, reinstating that same 
relation of indifference to the "historicity" of the event of Presence 
(Dasein) as being-in-the-world. And that the only way to pull out 
of this vicious circle today is precisely by a radical philosophical-
speculative investigation of the "principle of responsibility." 
In venturing the problem, we are prefectly aware of how 
"prejudiced" is the Prinzip Verantwortung thematic by now, which 
is equivalent-after the fall of the Prinzip Hoffnung-to the miserly 
wisdom of an antiutopian philosophy centered on the imperative 
of "scarcity," and on the scrupulous observance of "objective con-
straints. "26 But, in order to leave the shallows of such an outcome 
(which only a gross misunderstanding could exchange for "disen-
chantment"), there is but one road : understand the principle of 
responsibility in conformity with its most profound meaning, 
which is contained in its etymology. That is to say: as the ability 
to respond---apart from every abstract, formalistic and transcendental 
notion of liberty and of decision of the moderns, which today be-
comes sublimated in the euphoria of the bricolage or the imaginary 
"which seduces" on the part of the priests of the postmodern-to 
interrogration deriving from "necessity" and "destiny." 
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4. FREEDOM AND DESTINY: AFTER HEGEL, BEYOND HEIDEGGER 
The complaint concerning secularization has been transferred 
in the last few years increasingly decisively from the level of 
theological disputes to that of philosophical discussion. The terms 
of the debate in course are rather various. It is not, however, 
illegitimate to bring them back to two fundamental senses, which 
may be respectively indicated as the "decadent" meaning and the 
"emancipatory" meaning of the catchword secularization. 
In the first sense, secularization implies a reading of occidental 
history (and philosophy) in a "decadent" mode, as the progressive 
fall of the strong metaphysical nuclei in the inexorable "loss of 
the center. "27 In the second sense, the term secularization over-
shadows a process of positive liberation by new areas of life and 
reality, of new and unforeseen emancipatory chances for human 
thought and action. 
Seen contextually, the two meanings seem, however, to give 
rise to a double movement. More precisely: to a movement whose 
dualness results from a different and opposite way of looking at 
a single and identical phenomenon. Both senses, contextualized, 
seem, that is, to lead to the same result on the descriptive plane: 
the abandonment of the traditional "centered" structures, the col-
lapse of the "unchanging things" (to use Severino's 28 words), 
involve an irrevocable constitutional crisis in theoretical 
philosophy. At the end of this crisis are waiting, with different 
emphases but-as is clear from the recent anthology Filosofia '86, 
dedicated significantly to the "Secularization of philosophy" 29 -in 
substantially convergent ways, the diagnostic schema of Vattimo 
and the more markedly therapeutic one of Richard Rorty. For the 
former, the constitutional crisis of traditional philosophy seems 
to give rise to the proliferation of the historiographical activity as 
"exorcism. "3° For the latter, that same crisis leads to the thesis of 
the marginal activity of philosophy and a pragmatic-hermeneutic 
rehabilitation of the "doxastic" knowledge which is expressed in 
the formula-incontrovertibly anglo-saxon in flavor-of the 
"priority of democracy over philosophy." 31 
Except that, exactly at the point in which the two senses-
that of "decadent" and that of "emancipatory"-of secularization 
seem to converge, they return in reality to be represented as paths 
which fork. The fork, in fact, issues from the moment in which 
one seeks to establish no longer negatively or only descriptively, 
but positively-that is, hermeneutically-the meaning of seculari-
zation. In truth it is Vattimo himself who points out the need for 
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an unpretentious welding of the experience of the end of meta-
physics and the possibility of delineating a positive "task" for 
philosophy, able to overcome the limits of the "negativistic" and 
"deconstructionist" approaches. But it is precisely in the way in 
which the new positivity of thought is meant that opinions tend-
in the philosophical debate in progress and in the particular vol-
ume in question-"to divorce" again. 
In Filosofia '86 (and, sometimes, right at the very heart of the 
individual contributions themselves) the positive function of 
philosophy is in fact presented as being declined in inexorably 
antonymical ways. On the one hand, it comes to be understood 
in terms of a "procedural" conception founded on the communica-
tive reciprocity of a flexible rationality, not apodictic, and perme-
able to metaphor; on the other hand, the "positivity" comes 
instead to be formulated as the chance of a thinking capable of 
posing radical interrogations by making a breach in the solid wall 
of the secular theologies and the "worldviews" (or paradigms) 
which crowd the religious and scientific-technological fruits of the 
imagination of our epoch. In the most noted starting points of 
the debate, in which this renewed radical vocation for philosophy 
comes to take shape, the decadent and emancipatory meanings 
of secularization assume the form of a providential false move-
ment. 32 For which the only authentic, authentically radical way, 
to understand "freedom" of thought-opened by the conceptual 
schemas, edifying and salvational, of tradition- consists in its 
paradoxical overturning in terms of "necessity" and "destiny." The task 
which is thus opened in the presence of thought-or better: behind 
it-is then a renunciation, without going back, of every "task," 
of every construction, of every edifying "cultural model." Only 
from the renunciation of freedom (illusory) of Sinngebung, of the 
"gift of sense" of philosophizing understood as an incessant com-
pulsion to construct the "world," painting it with colored pieces 
of chalk, does the chance open up to understand thought starting 
from the dimension of destiny. This dimension can only be charac-
teristic of that thinking which demonstrates itself able to encounter 
"friction"-as Wittgenstein said-with reality: not of course of 
that thinking which relates to the latter as an object-to-construct, 
as a "smooth surface" free of ripples and obstacles. 33 
It is in this way that the idea of destiny calls into question 
that of necessity. The authentic "necessity of thought" is not the 
necessity set in place by thought-the relations that thought objec-
tifies as "world" -but the necessity that yields thinking: that originary 
friction with reality that drives thinking unawares, the "influential 
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scene" which every individual as such, "cast" into concrete life, 
finds himself facing alone, with his naked strength and "power," 
once the "new modern figures of the guardian angel" ("transcen-
dental I," "subject constituted out of every possible experience," 
etc.) have vanished. 34 
Only by starting here will philosophy, in the era of science 
and technics, be able to return to that enigma to which for millen-
nia we have given the name of" experience": to that horizon which 
"surrounds us from afar" and which represents the eternally in-
conclusive plot of our destiny. But does not all of that perhaps 
require of thought a new positive attitude, able to emancipate it 
from the passive (and parasitical) economy of the gloss and to 
project it, with all the risks and the potentialities of the opportun-
ity, towards a new dimension-after Hegel, beyond Heidegger? 
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